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In January 2012, President Obama released the 
National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. 
International trade has been and continues to be a 
powerful engine of the United States and global 
economic growth. The many cybersecurity challenges 
facing the U.S. include one of which many Americans 
are unaware – the serious threat posed by 
vulnerabilities in the cyber supply chain. Of the many 
components – including hardware, firmware, and 
software – that compose a technological product, most 
contain elements stemming from a broad global 
market, making it difficult to ascertain the complete 
security of an end product. With the market for 
technological goods and components continuing to 
rapidly grow every year, and with everything from 
missiles to smartphones relying on these information 
products, the need for mutual trust cyber supply chain 
security has never been more critical. 
Enhancing the security of any national interests’ 
technological supply chain must not destroy the well- 
functioning international market for technology. 
Instead of the two extremes of “intrusive government 
mandates” or “do nothing,” the U.S. government is 
promoting development of private-sector systems for 
securing and accrediting technology companies that 
would allow customers – from the federal government 
to small businesses – to make more informed and risk- 
based decisions. 
Organizations of all types (business, academia, 
government, etc.) are facing risks resulting from their 
ever- increasing reliance on the information 
infrastructure. Decision and policy makers managing 
these risks are challenged by a lack of information 
intelligence concerning the risks and consequences of 
cyber events (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPAA, and 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACT). They need to understand 
the implications of cyber security risks and solutions 
related to their information infrastructure and business. 
Risk management investment decisions, within the 
context of mutual trust among supply chains should 
involve: (i) a comprehensive approach to cyber 
security risk management, (ii) credible appropriate data 
needed to support intelligent decisions, and (iii) 
assessment of the impacts resulting from the various 
investment alternatives. Sound, rational IT/business 
decisions require a comprehensive understanding of 
the dynamics of information intelligence and the likely 
effects of cyber security investment choices. 
As our dependence on the cyber infrastructure and 
their associated supply chains grow ever larger, more 
complex, and more distributed, the systems that 
compose them become more prone to failures and/or 
exploitation. Trusted Supply Chains values currency 
and relevance over detail and accuracy. Information 
explosion describes the pervasive abundance of 
(public/private) information and the effects of such. 
Gathering, analyzing, and making use of information 
constitutes a business- / sociopolitical- / military-
intelligence gathering activity and ultimately poses 
significant advantages and liabilities to the 
survivability of "our" society. The combination of 
increased vulnerability, increased stakes and increased 
threats make supply chains and their associated 
processes one of the most important emerging 
challenges in the evolution of modern cyberspace 
"mechanization."  
In their contribution DANE Trusted Email for 
Supply Chain Management, Joseph Gersch, Dan 
Massey, and Scott Rose demonstrate the need for 
trusted email in supply chain management. Spear 
phishing, forgery, and other attacks can result in data 
breaches, industrial and government espionage, 
installation of malware, and financial theft. DANE 
email extensions are then posited as a solid foundation 
for global trusted email. The IETF protocol ‘Domain 
Authentication of Named Entities’ (DANE) described 
in this paper has been extended from its initial goal of 
providing TLS web site validation to also offer a 
foundation for globally scalable and interoperable 
email security. 
In the second paper A Structured Analysis of SQL 
Injection Runtime Mitigation Techniques, Stu Steiner, 
Daniel Conte de Leon, and Jim Alves-Foss address 
SQL injection attacks (SQLIA) which still remain one 
of the most commonly occurring and exploited 
vulnerabilities. A considerable amount of research 
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concerning SQLIA mitigation techniques has been 
conducted with the primary resulting solution requiring 
developers to code defensively. Although, defensive 
coding is a valid solution, the current market demand 
for websites is being filled by inexperienced 
developers with little knowledge of secure 
development practices. This paper presents an in-depth 
analysis and classification, based on Formal Concept 
Analysis, of the 10 major SQLIA runtime mitigation 
techniques. Based on this analysis, one technique was 
identified that shows the greatest potential for 
transition to enterprise use. This analysis also serves as 
an enhanced SQLIA mitigation classification system.  
In the third paper Reverse Engineering Integrated 
Circuits Using Finite State Machine Analysis,” Jessica 
Smith, Kiri Oler, Carl Miller, and David Manz expand 
their prior work, in which they proposed a novel 
method of reverse engineering the finite state machines 
(FSMs) that integrated circuits are built upon in a non-
destructive and highly specific manner. In this paper, 
the authors present a methodology for reverse 
engineering integrated circuits, including a 
mathematical verification of a scalable algorithm used 
to generate minimal FSM representations of integrated 
circuits. The method demonstrates that given an 
isolated state machine with a reset capability, the 
machine is modeled using a tree framework which 
allows for machine to machine comparisons and the 
comparison of states within the machine to find an 
optimal representation. Through this method it is 
possible to take a state machine-based IC and, using 
only the standard input and output pins, re-discover the 
original FSM. Consequently, they can determine if the 
in-silicon FSM matches the designed FSM, or 
rediscover the functionality of an unknown IC. Both 
capabilities provide a non-destructive means of 
validation for security purposes. 
In the final paper Towards a Cyber Defense 
Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power 
Consumption Monitoring, Jarilyn Hernández Jiménez, 
Qian Chen, Jeffrey Nichols, Chelsea Calhoun, and 
Summer Sykes present a Supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) testbed they developed with the 
objective to detect cyber-attacks by monitoring and 
analyzing the power consumption of a Programmable 
Logic Controller (PLC). The power consumption of the 
PLC was monitored under three attack scenarios: 
command injection, Denial of Service (DoS), and 
replay. Results shown that these cyberattacks leave a 
detectable signal on the power consumption of a PLC 
and in route to these results, the authors found and 
describe vulnerabilities in the DF-1 protocol (an 
asynchronous byte-oriented protocol used to 
communicate between the HMI and the PLC via the 
RS232 link). 
The goal of this inaugural minitrack is to challenge, 
establish and debate a far-reaching agenda that broadly 
and comprehensively outlines a strategy for mutual 
trust, cyber security, efficiency, and resilience of our 
vital global supply chain infrastructure research that is 
founded on sound principles and technologies. 
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